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I. INTRODUCTION 
 In its decision in Atkins v. Virginia, the United States 
Supreme Court ruled the execution of a mentally retarded 
defendant who has committed a capital crime is 
unconstitutional under the Cruel and Unusual Punishment 
Clause of the Eighth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution.1  The Court left to the individual states the 
obligation to determine how to apply the holding of Atkins.2  
Because of this, the states differ on the definition of mental 
retardation, which party bears the burden of proof, the 
standard of proof to be applied, and when the determination 
of retardation should be made.  Leaving the states to their own 
                                                 
* Kendall Inglish, J.D. 2014, Lincoln Memorial University Duncan 
School of Law; B.S., University of Tennessee at Chattanooga. The 
author wishes to thank Professor Charles MacLean and the Lincoln 
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1 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002).  
2 Id. 
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devices has denied some defendants full protection under the 
Eighth Amendment.  It is not necessary to enact a standard 
mental retardation definition, because there are case-by-case 
details that should be taken into consideration in proving the 
existence of mental retardation of that individual defendant; 
however, states should enact laws that uphold the Court’s 
holding in Atkins by establishing that (1) the defendant bears 
the burden of proof; (2) the standard of proof be 
preponderance of the evidence, and (3) the determination of 
mental retardation must be made prior to trial.  
II. INTRODUCTION TO THE DEATH PENALTY AND HOW IT 
APPLIES TO THE MENTALLY RETARDED 
 The United States Supreme Court has continuously 
expressed that “death is different” when it comes to deciding 
death penalty appeals.3  Since 1976, 1,350 people have been 
executed in the United States.4  From 1976 to 2002, of those 
executed, at least forty-four were defendants with mental 
retardation.5  In fact, it was not until 2002 that the United 
States Supreme Court acknowledged that mental retardation 
limits a defendant’s culpability to a degree that renders the 
death penalty cruel and unusual under the Eighth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution.6   
 In its 2002 landmark, Atkins v. Virginia, the Supreme 
Court ruled that it was unconstitutional to execute a mentally 
retarded defendant.7  Unfortunately, in its decision, the 
Supreme Court failed to advise the states which burden of 
proof standard should be used in determining a defendant’s 
                                                 
3 Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976). 
4 Death Penalty Info. Ctr., Number of Executions by State And Region Since 
1976, DEATHPENALTYINFO.ORG (last visited April 5, 2013), 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/number-executions-state-and-region-1976. 
5 Death Penalty Info. Ctr., List of Defendants With Mental Retardation 
Executed In The United States, DEATHPENALTYINFO.ORG, 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/list-defendants-mental-retardation-
executed-united-states (last visited April 5, 2013). 
6Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321; Peggy M. Tobolowsky, Atkins Aftermath: 
Identifying Mentally Retarded Offenders And Excluding Them From 
Execution, 30 J. LEGIS. 77, 82 (2003).  
7 Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321.   
HELP WANTED                      105 
 
 
alleged mental retardation.8  The Supreme Court’s failure to 
define the standard of proof to apply and which party bears 
the burden of proof, has denied mentally retarded capital 
defendants equal protection and due process rights under the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  Chillingly,   the failure by United 
States Supreme Court to establish a standard of proof means 
the difference between the defendant’s life and death.9    
 Therefore, states should enact laws treating allegations 
of mental retardation as an affirmative defense, so like in other 
affirmative defense cases, the defendant bears the burden of 
proof.  The states should further pass legislation standardizing 
the proof required to be introduced by a capital defendant. 
The standard of proof the states should adopt would be the 
preponderance of the evidence standard.  The preponderance 
of the evidence standard would afford all capital defendants 
alleging mental retardation protection under the United States 
Constitution.  
 The United States Supreme Court also failed to set 
forth in the Atkins decision when the determination as to a 
defendant’s alleged mental retardation should be made, 
causing inefficiency both in time and expense. Further, it 
creates bias in the judicial system in some states.   The states, 
therefore, should uphold the United States Supreme Court 
decision in Atkins and require that the determination as to a 
defendant’s mental retardation be made prior to trial. Such a 
procedure would be more likely to lead to a fair trial for 
mentally retarded defendants and create an efficient judicial 
process.    
 While the United States Supreme Court has righted the 
wrong illustrated in the 1976 decision in Penry v. Lynaugh, it 
did not provide practical recommendations to the states when 
applying Atkins, and therefore the states should endorse the 
Atkins holding to its fullest and intended effect so that 
mentally retarded defendants convicted of a capital crime are 
not denied their afforded protection under the United States 
Constitution.   
                                                 
8 James Gerard Eftink, et al, Mental Retardation As A Bar To The Death 
Penalty: Who Bears The Burden of Proof?, 75 MO. L. REV. 537, 568 
(2010). 
9 Id.  
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III. THE EXECUTION OF MENTALLY RETARDED PRIOR TO THE 
DECISION IN ATKINS V. VIRGINIA WAS BASED ON A 
“NATIONAL CONSENSUS” 
 The Eighth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution prohibits cruel and unusual punishment; 
however, whether or not it was intended by its founders, the 
amendment has been dynamic because its scope has been 
manipulated based on society’s progression.10  When the 
Supreme Court reviewed the case of Penry v. Lynaugh, one of 
the factors the Court seriously considered in determining 
whether the execution of a mentally retarded man was 
unconstitutionally cruel and unusual was society’s evolving 
standard of decency.11    
 John Paul Penry was charged with the 1979 brutal 
rape, beating, and fatal stabbing with a pair of scissors of a 
woman in Texas.12  Penry, who had been on parole for another 
rape conviction at the time he committed the murder, was 
found competent to stand trial even though he was found to 
be “mildly to moderately retarded” and had “the mental age 
of a six-and-a-half year old.”13  At his trial, doctors testified 
that Penry suffered from organic brain damage likely caused 
at birth and had an IQ at the time of trial of fifty-four.14  Penry, 
who was twenty-two years old at the time he committed the 
crime, had not only the mental age of a six-and-a-half year old 
child, but also the social maturity of a nine or ten-year-old 
child.15  Still, the jury found Penry competent to stand trial, 
convicted him, and sentenced him to death.16   
                                                 
10 Donald E. d'Entremont, Constitutional Law-Defendant's Mental 
Retardation Does Not Preclude Imposition of the Death Penalty As Long As 
the Sentencer Considers All Relevant Mitigating Evidence-Penry v. 
Lynaugh, 109 S. Ct. 2934 (1989), 24 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 221, 224 (1990) 
[hereinafter d'Entremont]. 
11 Id. at 224. 
12 Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 307 (1989), abrogated by Atkins v. 
Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002). 
13 Id. 
14 Id. 
15 Id. at 308. 
16 Id. 
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 The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed Penry’s 
conviction and sentence on direct appeal, determining that the 
death penalty was not prohibited due to Penry’s allegation of 
being mentally retarded. 17  Penry took his case to the District 
Court, which denied relief.18  Thus, Penry appealed to the 
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which affirmed the 
District Court’s judgment.19  
 Penry’s case finally reached the United States Supreme 
Court in 1989, to determine, inter alia, whether it was cruel and 
unusual punishment to execute a mentally retarded person.20  
Here, Penry argued his mental retardation acted as a 
mitigating factor, and therefore he should have been 
sentenced to a penalty less than death.21  In a five-to-four 
decision, the Supreme Court found mental retardation is a 
factor that may lessen a defendant’s culpability for a capital 
offense, but it could not be concluded in Penry’s case that the 
Eighth Amendment precluded the execution of a mentally 
retarded person of Penry’s ability.22   
 In support of its decision, the Supreme Court stated 
while mental retardation could be considered and given effect 
as a mitigating factor in sentencing, there was not enough 
evidence in Penry’s specific case to establish a national 
consensus against execution of the mentally retarded.23  The 
Court examined federal and state laws prohibiting such 
executions, public opinion surveys, and the position of the 
American Association on Mental Retardation, and found no 
consensus at the time against executing mentally retarded 
defendants.24  Therefore, the Court reasoned the states could 
continue to execute mentally retarded defendants until state 
legislatures reached a consensus prohibiting such executions.25   
                                                 
17 Penry v. Texas, 691 S.W.2d 636, 654-55 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985). 
18 Penry, 492 U.S. at 312. 
19 Penry v. Lynaugh, 832 F.2d 915, 926 (5th Cir. 1987), aff'd in part, rev'd 
in part, 492 U.S. 302 (1989) abrogated by Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 
321 (2002).  
20 Penry, 492 U.S. at 313. 
21 Id. at 315. 
22 Id. at 340. 
23 Id. 
24 d'Entremont, supra note 10, at 226. 
25 Id.; Linda L. Hinton, Criminal Law-Imposing the Death Penalty on 
Capital Defendants Who Are Mentally Retarded Is Not Prohibited by the 
Eighth Amendment To The Constitution If Instructions To The Jury Allow 
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While the state legislatures never did reach a consensus 
prohibiting such executions, the Supreme Court came to that 
decision thirteen years after Penry when it was asked to decide 
the case of Atkins v. Virginia.   
 
IV. THIRTEEN YEARS AFTER PENRY, THE UNITED STATES 
SUPREME COURT GOT IT RIGHT IN ATKINS BY BANNING 
THE EXECUTION OF MENTALLY RETARDED DEFENDANTS 
 Thirteen years after the decision not to exclude the 
mentally retarded from being sentenced to death was reached 
in Penry, the Supreme Court decided that the death penalty 
could no longer be used against the mentally retarded.  In a 
six-to-three decision, the Supreme Court reasoned in Atkins v. 
Virginia, that executing a mentally retarded person violates the 
Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth 
Amendment. 26 
 Daryl Renard Atkins was convicted in Circuit Court in 
Virginia of abduction, armed robbery, and capital murder and 
was facing the death penalty.27  In the penalty phase, the 
defense relied on testimony from a forensic psychologist who 
had evaluated Atkins and concluded that he was “mildly 
mentally retarded” based on interviews with people who 
knew Atkins, a review of school and court records, and by 
conducting an intelligence test, which indicated that Atkins 
had a full scale IQ of fifty-nine.28  The jury sentenced Atkins to 
death anyway, but the Virginia Supreme Court ordered a 
second sentencing hearing because the trial court had used a 
misleading verdict form.29  At the resentencing, the forensic 
psychologist testified again.30  However, the prosecution 
presented an expert rebuttal witness who expressed the 
opinion that Atkins was not mentally retarded, but rather was 
of “average intelligence, at least,” and diagnosable as having 
                                                                                                       
For The Consideration Of Mental Retardation As Mitigating Factor, 39 
DRAKE L. REV. 921, 928-29 (1990). 
26 Atkins, 536 U.S. at 307. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. at 308-09. 
29 Id. at 309. 
30 Id. 
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antisocial personality disorder.31  The jury again sentenced 
Atkins to death.32  The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed 
Atkins’ death sentence stating it was “not willing to commute 
Atkins’ sentence of death to life imprisonment merely because 
of his IQ score.”33  Because of the gravity of the concerns of the 
dissenters to the Virginia Supreme Court’s decision, and due 
to the dramatic shift of the state legislative landscape that 
occurred since the Penry decision, the Supreme Court decided 
to grant Atkins certiorari.34  Justice Stevens delivered the 
opinion of the Court stating: 
 
Those mentally retarded persons who meet 
the law's requirements for criminal 
responsibility should be tried and punished 
when they commit crimes. Because of their 
disabilities in areas of reasoning, judgment, 
and control of their impulses, however, they 
do not act with the level of moral culpability 
that characterizes the most serious adult 
criminal conduct. Moreover, their 
impairments can jeopardize the reliability and 
fairness of capital proceedings against 
mentally retarded defendants. Presumably for 
these reasons, in the 13 years since we 
decided Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 109 
S.Ct. 2934, 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989), the 
American public, legislators, scholars, and 
judges have deliberated over the question 
whether the death penalty should ever be 
imposed on a mentally retarded criminal. The 
consensus reflected in those deliberations 
informs our answer to the question presented 
by this case: whether such executions are 
“cruel and unusual punishments” prohibited 
by the Eighth Amendment to the Federal 
Constitution.35 
                                                 
31 Id. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. at 310 (citing Atkins v. Com., 534 S.E.2d 312, 321 (Va. 2000). 
34 Atkins, 536 U.S. at 310. 
35 Id. at 306-07. 
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V. INTERPRETATIONS POST-ATKINS BY THE STATES HAVE 
RESULTED IN AN UNDERMINING OF THE ATKINS 
HOLDING  
 After the decision was handed down in Atkins, the 
individual states were left to decide how to apply the holding 
to their own death penalty sentences.36  Each state has been left 
to define mental retardation, to decide the necessary proof in 
determining whether a defendant is mentally retarded, and to 
determine whether or not a defendant could be sentenced to 
the death penalty, because the United States Supreme Court 
did not create a bright-line rule for any of those factors.37  As a 
result, no uniform definition of mental retardation has been 
established.38  Some states, such as Idaho, have applied a 
definition of mental retardation that is viewed by some as so 
limiting that it offends a defendant’s rights under the United 
States Constitution.39  In Idaho, mental retardation is based on 
a fixed IQ number, although experts agree that an IQ number 
alone does not determine mental retardation.40  An Idaho 
defendant with an IQ of 71 or above could be set to be 
executed if convicted, even if that defendant could otherwise 
qualify as being mentally retarded.41  Other states, such as 
California, do not specify a certain IQ for determining mental 
retardation.42  Rather, California defines mental retardation as 
“significantly subaverage [sic] general intellectual functioning 
                                                 
36 Anna M. Hagstrom, Atkins v. Virginia: An Empty Holding Devoid of 
Justice for the Mentally Retarded, 27 LAW & INEQ. 241, 241-42 (2009) 
[hereinafter Hagstrom]. 
37 Id. at 242. 
38 Id. 
39 Am. Civil Liberties Union, Mental Retardation And The Death Penalty, 
ACLU.ORG (Sept. 4, 2003), http://www.aclu.org/capital-punishment/mental-
retardation-and-death-penalty (last visited Oct. 19, 2013) [hereinafter 
Mental Retardation And The Death Penalty].   
40
 See IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-2515A(1)(b) (West, WestlawNext current 
through 2013); Mental Retardation And The Death Penalty, supra note 39.  
41 IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-2515A(1)(b) (West, WestlawNext current 
through 2013); Mental Retardation And The Death Penalty, supra note 39.  
42 Sara Catania, Death Row’s IQ Divide, L.A. TIMES OPINION (May 8, 
2007), http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/commentary/la-oe-
catania8may08,0,1060490.story. 
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existing concurrently with deficits in adaptive behavior and 
manifested before the age of 18.”43 
 Inconsistencies also result, depending on when the 
determination of mental retardation is made.44  In Louisiana 
and Virginia, prosecutors have argued the determination 
should always be made post-conviction by the same jury that 
found the defendant guilty.45  In Louisiana, the determination 
of mental retardation can be made pre-trial by a judge but 
only if the prosecutor agrees the determination be made then, 
otherwise it is left to sentencing by the jury.46  In Virginia, the 
determination is made by the jury or the judge in non-jury 
trials during the defendant’s sentencing.47  However, 
efficiency in the administration of justice dictates that a pre-
trial determination on a defendant’s mental retardation would 
save time and money associated with the prosecution of a 
death penalty trial.48    
 Additionally, there have been irregularities among the 
states in establishing the standard of proof necessary to 
determine whether a defendant should be sentenced to 
death.49  Currently sitting on death row in Georgia is Warren 
Hill, an inmate with an IQ of 70, who was granted a stay of 
execution on February 19, 2013, within thirty minutes of his 
scheduled time to receive a lethal injection.50  In 1991, Hill was 
                                                 
43 CAL. PENAL CODE § 1376 (West, West, WestlawNext current with 
urgency legislation through Ch. 526, except Ch. 352, of 2013 Reg.Sess.). 
44 Mental Retardation And The Death Penalty, supra note 39; see also John 
H. Blume et al., Of Atkins and Men, 18 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 689, 
693 (2009). 
45 LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 905.5.1(C)(1)-(2) (West, WestlawNext 
current through 2013 Reg Session); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.3:1.1 
(West, WestlawNext current through 2013 Reg. Session); Mental 
Retardation And The Death Penalty, supra note 39.  
46 LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. ART. 905.5.1(C)(1) (West, WestlawNext 
current through 2013 Reg. Session); Death Penalty Info. Ctr., States That 
Have Changed Their Statutes To Comply With the Supreme Court’s 
Decision in Atkins v. Virginia, DEATHPENALTYINFO.ORG (last visited Mar. 3, 
2013), http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/states-have-changed-their-statutes-
comply-supreme-courts-decision-atkins-v-virginia. 
47 VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.3:1.1 (West, WestlawNext current through 
2013 Reg. Session). 
48 Mental Retardation and the Death Penalty, supra note 39. 
49 Hagstrom, supra note 36, at 266. 
50 Ed Pilkington, Georgia Inmate Warren Hill Granted Stay of Execution 30 
Minutes Before Lethal Injection, GUARDIAN.CO.UK, 
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sentenced to death after he killed his cellmate in prison.51  Hill 
was incarcerated at the time for killing his eighteen-year-old 
girlfriend.52  In Georgia, a defendant who alleges intellectual 
disability for avoiding the death penalty must prove the 
disability beyond a reasonable doubt.53  Hill was sentenced to 
the death penalty after he was unable to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that he was mentally retarded.54  The beyond 
a reasonable doubt standard is one in which experts say is 
almost impossible to achieve when using that standard to 
assess mental retardations.55  Even those doctors who 
diagnosed Hill with an IQ of 70, which constitutes mild mental 
retardation, found it impossible to meet this standard.56  All 
three of the doctors who examined Hill have reversed their 
opinion that Hill had not met the legal definition of “mentally 
retarded” and that their original evaluation of the Hill was 
“extremely and unusually rushed.”57  Georgia continues to 
hold capital defendants to the strictest standard of proof to 
show intellectual disability should preclude the death 
penalty.58  Georgia is an outlier, as twenty-eight of the thirty-
                                                                                                       
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/feb/20/warren-hill-stay-of-execution 
(last visited Feb. 20, 2013); Death Penalty Info. Ctr., Georgia Disabilities 
Expert Calls for Halt to Execution of Inmate With Mental Retardation, 
DEATHPENALTYINFO.ORG,  http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/georgia-
disabilities-expert-calls-halt-execution-inmate-mental-retardation (last 
visited Mar. 3, 2013); Eric Jacobson, The Supreme Court Must Stop the 
Execution of Warren Hill, HUFF POST CRIME, 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/eric-jacobson/warren-hill-
execution_b_2665094.html (last visited Feb. 11, 2013).  
51 Huffington Post, Warren Hill Execution Stayed: Georgia Death Row 
Inmate Spared in Last Minute Decision, HUFF POST CRIME, (Feb. 19, 2013, 
11:32 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/02/19/warren-hill-
execution-stayed_n_2720700.html  [hereinafter Warren Hill Execution 
Stayed: Georgia Death Row Inmate Spared in Last Minute Decision]. 
52 Id. 
53 GA. CODE ANN. § 17-7-131 (West 2015); Warren Hill Execution Stayed: 
Georgia Death Row Inmate Spared in Last Minute Decision, supra note 51. 
54 Warren Hill Execution Stayed: Georgia Death Row Inmate Spared in 
Last Minute Decision, supra note 51.   
55 Id. 
56 Id. 
57 Id. 
58 Id. 
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three states with the death penalty use a lower standard for 
proving mental retardation.59 
 One of those states which require a lower standard of 
proof for avoiding the death penalty based on mental 
retardation is Arizona.  On January 3, 2013, “after more than 
13 years and two trials,” the Arizona Supreme Court ruled 
that Shawn Grell could not be executed because he was 
mentally retarded.60  Grell’s sentence was reduced to life in 
prison without possibility of parole for the 1999 murder of his 
two-year-old daughter by lighting her on fire after dousing 
her with gasoline.61  At trial, Grell’s attorneys failed to prove 
by Arizona’s clear and convincing evidence standard that he 
was mentally retarded.62  But on appeal, the Arizona Supreme 
Court ruled that Grell was mentally retarded using a lower 
standard of preponderance of the evidence.63  The Arizona 
Attorney General’s Office plans to appeal the Arizona 
Supreme Court’s ruling based on the fact that Grell was not 
found mentally retarded under the higher legal standard of 
clear and convincing evidence required by state law, but 
instead by a standard of preponderance of the evidence.64  The 
Arizona Attorney General intends to seek legislation that 
would clarify the standard for future cases involving 
defendants who claim to be mentally retarded since Grell was 
found mentally retarded by preponderance of the evidence 
even though the statute in Arizona requires a defendant to 
                                                 
59 The New York Times, An Intolerable Burden of Proof, THE OPINION 
PAGES (Nov. 29, 2011), available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/30/opinion/an-intolerable-burden-of-
proof.html?_r=0 (last visited Aug. 8, 2012).  
60 Arizona v. Grell, 291 P.3d 350, 357 (Ariz. 2013); Jim Walsh, Arizona 
Court Reduces Shawn Grell’s Death Sentence to Life, AZCENTRAL.COM 
(Jan. 9, 2013), 
http://www.azcentral.com/community/mesa/articles/20130109arizona-
court-reduces-shawn-grell-death-sentence-life-brk.html (hereinafter Walsh). 
61 Grell, 291 P.3d at 357; Walsh, supra note 60. 
62 Grell, 291 P.3d at 351; Walsh, supra note 60; ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
13-753(g) (West, WestlawNext legislation effective June 20, 2013 of the 
First Regular Session of the Fifty-first Legislature).  
63 Grell, 291 P.3d at 357; Walsh, supra note 60 (“Teachers and school 
officials were reluctant to label Grell as retarded for fear of angering his 
mother, referring to behavioral disorders instead when assigning him to 
special-education classes.”). 
64 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-753; Grell, 291 P.3d at 357; Walsh, supra 
note 60.  
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prove mental retardation by a clear and convincing evidence 
standard.65 
 Those defendants on death row prior to the decision in 
Atkins have also met obstacles in appealing their sentences.  
The Fifth Circuit denied Bruce Webster, an inmate on federal 
death row for the 1994 kidnapping, rape, and murder of an 
Arkansas teen, an appeal to prove he was mentally retarded, 
because he had exhausted his appeals to the point where new 
evidence to prove his intellectual disability was not allowed 
unless that new evidence could show that Webster was 
innocent.66  The allegedly weak weight of Webster’s new 
evidence, including three doctors who diagnosed him as 
mentally retarded, and the fact he had applied for Social 
Security Disability benefits due to his mental retardation the 
year prior to the murder he committed, was not the reason for 
the denial by the Fifth Circuit and affirmation by the United 
States Supreme Court.67  Rather, a 1996 federal criminal law 
severely limiting the number of appeals an inmate can make 
stopped Webster from possibly establishing his mental 
retardation post-Atkins.68 
 Even inconsistencies in applying the bare bones ruling 
of Atkins (no death penalty sentence for the mentally retarded) 
have been felt since its decision was entered.  In August 2012, 
Marvin Wilson, a defendant with an IQ of 61, was executed in 
Texas.69  Generally, an IQ of around 70 or as high as 75 
                                                 
65 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-753; Grell, 291 P.3d at 357; Walsh, supra 
note 60.  
66 United States v. Webster, 421 F.3d 308, 309 (5th Cir. 2005); Scott 
Goldstein, High Court Denies Appeal of Mentally Retarded Man Who 
Helped Rape, Kill Arlington Teen, THE DALLAS MORNING NEWS (Dec. 7, 
2010, 6:54 AM), http://www.dallasnews.com/news/community-
news/arlington/headlines/20101207-high-court-denies-appeal-of-mentally-
retarded-man-who-helped-rape-kill-arlington-teen.ece [hereinafter 
Goldstein]. 
67 United States v. Webster, 421 F.3d 308, 312 (5th Cir. 2005); Goldstein, 
supra note 66.   
68 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.104–
132, 110 Stat 1214 (1996); Goldstein, supra note 66. 
69 David R. Dow, Supreme Court Outlawed Executing Mentally Retarded, 
But Texas Does It Anyway, U.S. NEWS (Aug. 14, 2012, 4:45 AM), 
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2012/08/14/supreme-court-outlawed-
executing-mentally-retarded-but-texas-does-it-anyway.html (last visited 
Aug. 19, 2012) [hereinafter Dow]; Kate Randall, Texas Executes Mentally 
Disabled Death Row Prisoner, WORLD SOCIALIST WEBSITE (Aug. 8, 2012), 
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indicates limited intellectual functioning.70  Texas allowed for 
the execution of Wilson, convicted of murdering a police 
informant in 1992, using precedent from the Texas Court of 
Criminal Appeals decision established in Ex parte Briseno.71  In 
Ex parte Briseno, a mentally retarded defendant was executed 
because his retardation was deemed to be mild.72  From this 
2004 case, Texas uses a “Briseno factors” test to determine 
mental retardation.73  These “Briseno factors” are arguably 
subjective and stereotypical and without any scientific data to 
back them up.74  These factors include but are not limited to 
asking people who knew the defendant whether they thought 
he was “mentally retarded” to whether the crime committed 
required forethought.75   
 On February 29, 2012, Arizona executed Robert 
Moorman, who was diagnosed as being mentally retarded and 
having attended special education classes while in public 
school.76  Moorman was sentenced to death for the 1984 
murder of his adoptive mother who he killed while out on a 
three-day furlough while serving a nine-year prison term for 
                                                                                                       
http://www.wsws.org/Fen/articles/2012/08/wils-a08.html (last visited Aug. 
19, 2013) [hereinafter Randall]. 
70 Am. Ass’n of Intellectual and Dev’l Disabilities, Definition of Intellectual 
Disability, AIDD.ORG, http://www.aaidd.org/content_100.cfm?navID=21. 
71 Ex parte Briseno, 135 S.W.3d 1, 8 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004); Dustin Volz, 
Court Also Rejects Appeal for Man Scheduled to Die Next Week, Tucson 
Sentinen.com (Feb. 29, 2012, 11:31 AM), 
http://www.tucsonsentinel.com/local/report/022912_az_executions/man-
put-death-after-last-minute-appeals-fail/, David R. Dow, Supreme Court 
Outlawed Executing Mentally Retarded, But Texas Does It Anyway, 
U.S.NEWS (Aug. 14, 2012, 4:45 AM), 
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2012/08/14/supreme-court-outlawed-
executing-mentally-retarded-but-texas-does-it-anyway.html. 
72 Briseno, 135 S.W.3d at 18; Dow, supra note 68. 
73 Briseno, 135 S.W.3d at 8; Randall, supra note 68. 
74 Briseno, 135 S.W.3d at 8; Randall, supra note 68. 
75 John H. Blume et. al., Of Atkins and Men: Deviations from Clinical 
Definitions of Mental Retardation in Death Penalty Cases, 18 CORNELL J.L. 
& PUB. POL'Y 689, 712 (2009). 
76 Michael Kiefer, Execution to Conclude Shocking Arizona Murder Case, 
NEWS (Feb. 25, 2012, 10:19 PM), 
http://www.azcentral.com/news/articles/20120224arizona-murder-case-
execution-moormann.html [hereinafter Kiefer].  
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the 1984 kidnapping and molesting of a nine-year-old girl.77  A 
defendant in Arizona, by clear and convincing evidence, must 
prove the criteria of being mentally retarded to avoid the 
death penalty under Atkins.78  One doctor witness, who often 
testifies against inmates, said Moorman was “absolutely” 
mentally disabled, which would make it illegal for Arizona to 
execute him because of Atkins.79  Other doctors said that 
Moorman’s intellect was just above someone who is legally 
considered mentally disabled.80   
 Ten years after the Atkins decision, Alabama reduced 
the sentence of one of their longest serving death row inmates 
because of the defendant’s intellectual disability.  Bobby 
Tarver, convicted in 1982 of murdering a taxi cab driver, had 
his death sentence overturned by a federal judge because of 
Tarver’s mental retardation.81  In 2003, Melanie Anderson’s 
sentence to the death penalty for the 1994 beating and torture 
death of her boyfriend’s three-year-old niece was reversed to 
life in prison after she was deemed mentally retarded.82 
 
VI. STATES SHOULD REQUIRE THAT A DEFENDANT BEAR THE 
BURDEN OF PROOF IN SHOWING MENTAL RETARDATION 
AS AN AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
  
 Currently, only fourteen of the thirty-three states with 
the death penalty have enacted statutes shifting the burden of 
                                                 
77 Arizona v. Moorman, 744 P.2d 679, 681-82 (Ariz. 1987); Kiefer, supra 
note 76 (Moorman’s representatives said he killed his adoptive mother after 
years of suffering sexual abuse from her). 
78 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-753(G); Arizona v. Grell, 291 P.3d 350, 352 
(Ariz. 2013).  
79 Moorman, 744 P.2d at 688; Kiefer, supra note 76. 
80 Moorman, 744 P.2d at 688; Kiefer, supra note 76. 
81 Tarver v. Thomas, No. 07-00294-CG-B, 2012 WL 4461710, at *20 (S.D. 
Ala. Sept. 24, 2012); Brendan Kirby, Judge Changes Sentence of Mobile 
County’s Longest-Serving Death Row Inmate to Life, BLOG.AL.COM (Dec. 
6, 2012, 3:53 PM), 
http://blog.al.com/live/2012/12/judge_changes_sentence_of_mobi.html. 
82 North Carolina v. Anderson, 94 CRS 5669, 95 CVR 887 (N.C. Gen. Ct. 
Justice Superior Ct. Div. July, 29, 2003); Jerry Lankford, A Look at Capital 
Punishment and Wilkes County Moratorium on Executions Possible, THE 
RECORD (June 11, 2003), 
http://www.therecordofwilkes.com/newsa.asp?edition_number=187&pg=F. 
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proving mental retardation to the defendant.83  Since the 
decision in Atkins, three states have not set a standard of proof 
at all, but still require that the defendant prove his or her 
mental retardation.84  Historically, the prosecution bears the 
burden of proof in criminal cases; however, as to certain 
defenses, various jurisdictions assign one or more of the 
burdens to the defense.85  When it comes to proving an 
affirmative defense, federal courts have upheld statutory law 
requiring the defendant to bear the burden of proof.86  A 
defendant uses an affirmative defense to admit that he has 
acted in the way in which he has been accused, but that his 
conduct was justifiable, excusable, or could be mitigated for a 
particular reason, and therefore should reduce or negate the 
crime which he has been charged with.87  Mental retardation 
should, therefore, be considered an affirmative defense and 
shift the burden of proof to the defendant because it is offered 
by the defendant to excuse or mitigate his actions in an effort 
to avoid being sentenced to death.  In further support that the 
burden should be borne by the defendant, it should be noted 
that no state statute currently exists that places the burden on 
the prosecution to prove that the defendant is not mentally 
retarded.88  Once the states enact legislation placing the 
burden of proof with the defendant, the question becomes 
what that standard of proof should be.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
83 Yamilka M. Rolon,  Mental Retardation And The Death Penalty, J. AM. 
ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. ONLINE (June 2008), 
http://www.jaapl.org/content/36/2/250.full (hereinafter Rolon). 
84 Pruitt v. Indiana, 834 N.E. 2d 90, 102 (Ind. 2005); Rolon, supra note 82. 
85 1 JONES ON EVIDENCE § 5:18 (7th ed. 2012). 
86 Matthew S. Gray, Proof Issues, 84 GEO. L.J. 1248, 1252 (1996). 
87 Scott R. Poe, Inconsistent Methods for the Adjudication of Alleged 
Mentally Retarded Individuals: A Comparison of Ohio's and Georgia's 
Post-Atkins Frameworks for Determining Mental Retardation, 54 CLEV. ST. 
L. REV. 405, 421 (2006) [hereinafter Poe]. 
88  Missouri v. Johnson, 244 S.W.3d 144, 150 (Mo. 2008). 
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VII. STATE SHOULD REQUIRE THAT A DEFENDANT PROVE 
MENTAL RETARDATION USING A PREPONDERANCE OF 
THE EVIDENCE STANDARD TO AVOID UNDERMINING THE 
HOLDING OF ATKINS 
 Because the United States Supreme Court did not set a 
standard of proof to be applied by the states in Atkins, state 
legislatures are permitted to enact any or no laws mandating 
what standard their state will apply as long as it is 
“appropriate.”89   
 
The function of a standard of proof, as that 
concept is embodied in the Due Process Clause 
and in the realm of fact finding, is to “instruct 
the factfinder concerning the degree of 
confidence our society thinks he should have in 
the correctness of factual conclusions for a 
particular type of adjudication.”90   
 
Since the Atkins decision, three states with the death penalty 
have not set a standard of proof.91  Six states with the death 
penalty have enacted statutes requiring a preponderance of 
the evidence standard, with eighteen death penalty states 
keeping their pre-Atkins preponderance of the evidence 
standard.92  Four states with the death penalty require a clear 
                                                 
89 Ed Pilkington, Georgia Lawyers Rush To Save ‘Mentally Retarded’ 
Death Row Inmate, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 17, 2013, 9:56 AM), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/feb/17/warren-hill-georgia-inmate-
execution#cb=f39e0ebe6227d6&origin=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.guardian.c
o.uk%2Ff3928fdbf733eb8&domain=www.guardian.co.uk&relation=parent
&error=unknown_user. 
90 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 370 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
91 Pruitt, 834 N.E. 2d at 102; Rolon, supra note 83. 
92 Rolon, supra note 83; The National Judicial College, Case and Statute 
References for Mental Retardation, JUDGES.ORG (last visited April 12, 
2013), 
http://www.judges.org/capitalcasesresources/bookpdf/appendices/Case%20
and%20Statute%20References%20for%20Mental%20Retardation.pdf; see 
Smith v. Alabama, 2007 Ala. LEXIS 91, 32-33 (Ala. May 25, 2007) (citing 
Morrow v. Alabama, 928 So. 2d 315, 323 (Ala. Crim. App. 2004); see also 
Holladay v. Campbell, 463 F. Supp. 2d 1324, 1341 n.21 (N.D. Ala. 2006)); 
A.C.A. § 5-4-618(a)(2),(c) (2008); CAL. PEN. CODE. § 1376(b)(3) (2008); 
COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-1102(2) (2008); see also Colorado v. Vasquez, 
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and convincing evidence standard.93  Only one state with the 
death penalty, Georgia, requires that a defendant prove 
mental retardation beyond a reasonable doubt standard.94   
 First, we must look at the standards of proof that fail to 
uphold the intention of Atkins to move toward the correct 
standard of proof that should rest upon the defendant.  
Placing a standard of proof of beyond a reasonable doubt 
upon a defendant is unconstitutional because it makes it 
almost impossible for those capital defendants with mental 
retardation from proving their condition.95  For example, a 
capital defendant who alleges mental retardation in Georgia 
has to introduce more evidence than a capital defendant 
alleging mental retardation in any other state and that proof 
must show with “virtual certainty” that the defendant is 
mentally retarded.96  Consequently, doubt can easily be 
                                                                                                       
84 P.3d 1019 (Colo. 2004); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209(d)(3); IDAHO 
CODE ANN. § 19-2515A(3) (2008); 725 ILCS 5/114-15(b) (2009);  Bowling 
v. Kentucky, 163 S.W.3d 361, 382 (Ky. 2005); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. Art. 
905.5.1(C)(1) (2008); MD. CODE ANN., Crim. Law § 2-202(b)(2)(ii); see 
Chase v. Missouri, 873 So.2d 1013, 1029 (Miss. 2004); MO. REV. ST. § 
565.030.4(1) (2008); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-105.01(4) (2008); NEV. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 174.098.5(b) (2008); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2005(c), (f) 
(2008) (standard of proof is preponderance of the evidence if determined by 
a jury, clear and convincing evidence if determined by a court); Ohio v. 
Lott, 779 N.E.2d 1011, 1015 (Ohio 2002); Murphy v. Oklahoma, 54 P.3d 
556, 568 (Okla. Crim. App. 2002); Blonner v. Oklahoma, 2006 OK CR 1, 
6-8 (Okla. Crim. App. 2006); see Franklin v. Maynard, 588 S.E.2d 604, 606 
(S.C. 2003); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-27A-26.3 (2009); TENN. CODE 
ANN. § 39-13-203(c) (2008); Ex Parte Briseno, 135 S.W.3d 1, 12 (Tex. 
Crim. App. 2004); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-15a-104(11)(a); VA. CODE ANN. 
§ 19.2-264.3:1.1(C); WASH. REV. CODE § 10.95.030(2) (2008).  
93 Rolon, supra note 83; The National Judicial College, Case and Statute 
References for Mental Retardation, JUDGES.ORG (last visited April 12, 
2013), 
http://www.judges.org/capitalcasesresources/bookpdf/appendices/Case%20
and%20Statute%20References%20for%20Mental%20Retardation.pdf; 
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-703.02(G) (2007); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.137(4) 
(2008); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-36-9-4(b) (2008); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-
2005(c), (f) (2008). 
94 Rolon, supra note 83; O.C.G.A. § 17-7-131(c)(3) (2008) 
95 Andrew Cohen, Executing The Mentally Retarded: The Night The Lights 
Went Out In Georgia, THE ATLANTIC (Feb. 13, 2013, 11:54 AM), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2013/02/executing-the-
mentally-retarded-the-night-the-lights-went-out-in-georgia/273088/. 
96 Poe, supra note 87, at 420. 
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introduced by expert testimony and an effective opposing 
expert can raise doubt enough to sentence a defendant to 
death who would otherwise be considered mentally 
retarded.97  The United States Supreme Court has never 
“suggested much less held, that a burden of proof standard on 
its own can so wholly burden an Eighth Amendment right as 
to eviscerate or deny that right.”98  Because of their disabilities 
in areas of reasoning, judgment, and control of their impulses, 
the mentally retarded do not act with the level of moral 
culpability that characterizes the most serious adult criminal 
conduct.99  Requiring such a high standard of proof such as 
Georgia’s standard denies a capital defendant protection and 
due process and undermines the Atkins holding.   
 Clear and convincing evidence is “evidence indicating 
that the thing to be proved is highly probable or reasonably 
certain.”100  At least one state has found that a clear and 
convincing evidence standard placed on a defendant trying to 
prove mental retardation is unconstitutional under Atkins.101  
In Pruitt v. State, the Supreme Court of Indiana reasoned that 
assigning the clear and convincing evidence standard to a 
defendant to prove his allegation of mental retardation in 
avoiding a sentence of death was a violation of the Eighth 
Amendment because “the defendant’s right not to be executed 
if mentally retarded outweighs the state’s interest as a matter 
of federal constitutional law.”102  The Indiana Supreme Court 
analogized the Pruitt case with Cooper v. Oklahoma, which 
found that requiring a defendant to prove his competence to 
stand trial by a clear and convincing evidence standard was a 
violation of his right to due process.103 
 In Cooper v. Oklahoma, the United States Supreme Court 
unanimously decided that a defendant did not have to prove 
his competency to stand trial by a clear and convincing 
                                                 
97 The New York Times, An Intolerable Burden of Proof, THE OPINION 
PAGES (Nov. 29, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/30/opinion/an-
intolerable-burden-of-proof.html?_r=0. 
98 Id. 
99 Atkins, 536 U.S. at 306. 
100 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, (9th ed. 2009).  
101 Pruitt, 834 N.E.2d at 103. 
102 Id.  
103 Id. (citing Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 369 (1996)).  
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standard because it was too high of a burden.104  The Court 
reasoned that assigning a burden of clear and convincing 
evidence to the defendant places a “significant risk of an 
erroneous determination that the defendant is competent.”105   
Further, the Court found that a clear and convincing evidence 
standard allocates a large share of the risk to the defendant.106  
The Court reasoned the clear and convincing evidence 
standard was such a harsh standard that it violates a 
defendant’s right to due process of law and that the standard 
assigned should be a preponderance of the evidence 
standard.107  While the Cooper case was to determine 
competency to stand trial, it should still be looked to for 
guidance in deciding the standard to assign a capital 
defendant alleging mental retardation because the issues are 
analogous.  
 The “more stringent the burden of proof a party must 
bear, the more that party bears the risk of an erroneous 
decision.”108  To avoid an erroneous decision being made in a 
decision as important as life or death of a defendant, states 
should require that at a maximum the standard of proof 
assigned to a capital defendant alleging an affirmative defense 
of mental retardation is the standard of preponderance of the 
evidence.  A standard of preponderance of the evidence means 
“superior evidentiary weight that, though not sufficient to free 
the mind wholly from all reasonable doubt, is still sufficient to 
incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather 
than the other.”109  Currently, the majority of states that have 
enacted legislation requiring the capital defendant prove their 
mental retardation by a certain burden of proof have chosen 
that burden to be by a preponderance of the evidence.110  
 States should treat a determination of mental 
retardation similar to the United States Supreme Court’s 
                                                 
104 Cooper, 517 U.S. at 369. 
105 Id. at 363. 
106 Id. at 366. 
107 Id. 
108 Cruzan by Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 283 
(1990). 
109 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009). 
110 Mary Hollingsworth, State v. Grell: Placing the Burden on Defendants 
to Prove Mental Retardation in Capital Cases, 49 ARIZ. L. REV. 775, 778 
(2007). 
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treatment of competency for trial and require that the standard 
of proof that a capital defendant must prove be by a 
preponderance of evidence.111  The argument for this 
treatment is: the risk to a capital defendant who must meet a 
burden higher than preponderance of the evidence is dire, 
whereas the risk to the state is modest.112 
 When the burden of proof is at the lower standard of 
preponderance of the evidence, success by capital defendants 
claiming mental retardation is not frequent, which illustrates 
that a preponderance of the evidence standard is not just a 
“free pass” for a capital defendant alleging mental retardation 
trying to avoid the death penalty.113  For example, in Virginia, 
which requires a capital defendant prove mental retardation 
by a preponderance of the evidence, the success rate is zero 
percent for the six capital defendants who have alleged mental 
retardation to avoid the death penalty.114  Similarly, Alabama, 
which has a preponderance of the evidence standard, has only 
a twelve percent success rate for the twenty-six capital 
defendants who have alleged mental retardation to avoid the 
death penalty.115   
 Therefore, subjecting a capital defendant to prove an 
allegation of mental retardation at any standard higher than 
preponderance of the evidence would shift the allocation of 
risk, and would be dire for the defendant’s defense.  All states 
with the death penalty should refine their legislation by 
joining the majority of states and mandate that the standard of 
proof be preponderance of the evidence to avoid deflating the 
Atkins holding.  
 
                                                 
111 Cooper, 517 U.S. at 355. 
112 Id. at 364-65. 
113 Kenneth Williams, Most Deserving Of Death? An Analysis Of The 
Supreme Court’s Death Penalty Jurisprudence, (last visited April 5, 2013), 
available at 
http://books.google.com/books?id=nAxAOUWyacUC&pg=PA100&lpg=P
A100&dq=mentally+retarded+states+preponderance&source=bl&ots=WTE
vuCtXqP&sig=j4XANVEpcPCjQeVDvnOUuvLS7zk&hl=en&sa=X&ei=i
wBiUbiFJJHM9ATPyoDYBQ&ved=0CDwQ6AEwAg#v=onepage&q=me
ntally%20retarded%20states%20preponderance&f=false. 
114 Id. 
115 Id. 
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VIII. STATES SHOULD ENACT STATUTORY LAW REQUIRING 
THAT THE DETERMINATION OF A DEFENDANT’S 
ALLEGED MENTAL RETARDATION BE DECIDED PRIOR 
TO THE TRIAL COMMENCING 
 The determination of whether a capital defendant is 
mentally retarded by the standard of preponderance of the 
evidence should be made prior to trial. This would eliminate 
any bias that may occur by the factfinder if the determination 
was made after the guilt phase and to encourage efficiency of 
resources, time, and expense.  Mental retardation is a 
“threshold issue that determines whether a defendant is 
eligible for capital punishment at all.”116  Currently, in many 
states, the same jury that finds a defendant guilty during the 
guilt phase of the trial decides whether to impose the death 
penalty by considering any aggravating or mitigating 
factors.117  Consideration of a capital defendant’s mental 
retardation during the penalty phase, in addition to being 
made by the same jury that found a defendant guilty during 
the guilt phase, can cause a higher risk of wrongful execution, 
because “[m]entally retarded defendant[s] may be less able to 
give meaningful assistance to their counsel and are typically 
poor witnesses, and their demeanor may create an 
unwarranted impression of lack of remorse for their 
crimes.”118 While the determination of a mental retardation 
includes fact-finding, mental retardation itself “is not the 
functional equivalent of an element of a crime;” therefore, 
determination by a jury is not constitutionally required under 
the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and 
may be left to the judge to decide prior to trial.119   
 Proceeding as a noncapital case conserves significant 
resources by reducing litigation expenses and expediting the 
                                                 
116 Howell v. Tennessee, 151 S.W.3d 450, 465 (Tenn. 2004). 
117 Id. 
118 Jessica Hudson, et al., Lightning but No Thunder: The Need for Clarity 
in Military Courts Regarding the Definition of Mental Retardation in 
Capital Cases and for Procedures in Implementing Atkins v. Virginia, 55 
NAVAL L. REV. 359, 374 (2008) (citing Flores, 93 P.3d at 1269 (quoting 
Atkins, 536 U.S. at 320-21)) [hereinafter Hudson]. 
119 Grell, 135 P.3d at 706.   
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overall proceedings.120  Trying a capital defendant is more 
time consuming, expensive, and leads to a greater use of state 
legal resources because the government must avoid errors, 
which could prove fatal, in trying a death penalty case.121  
Allowing a trial judge to issue a pre-trial determination as to a 
capital defendant’s mental retardation is “economical in terms 
of the time and cost that might be saved by avoiding a capital 
trial.”122  In light of that fact, “every effort must be made to 
avoid a death-penalty trial, as early in the proceedings as 
possible, where capital punishment is precluded as a matter of 
law.”123  Additionally, should a determination of mental 
retardation be made by the judge prior to trial, an otherwise 
capital defendant could decide to plea, thus expediting the 
judicial process.124 
 Therefore, to provide full constitutional protection to a 
capital defendant and to encourage efficiency of the criminal 
system in applying Atkins, the states should enact legislation 
                                                 
120 See New Mexico v. Flores, 93 P.3d 1264, 1269 (N.M. 2004) 
(recognizing that a capital murder trial consumes significantly more 
resources than a non-capital trial and that it would be beneficial to all 
parties to resolve the question of whether the defendant is eligible for the 
death penalty as early as possible); 
Hudson, supra note 118, at 391. 
121 Nicci Lovre-Laughlin, Lethal Decisions: Examining the Role of 
Prosecutorial Discretion in Capital Cases in South Dakota and the Federal 
Justice System, 50 S.D. L. REV. 550, 574 (2005). 
122 Pennsylvania v. Sanchez, 36 A.3d 24, 80 (Pa. 2011) cert. denied, 133 S. 
Ct. 122 (2012). 
123 Id.; Flores, 93 P.3d at 1269; see Atkins, 536 U.S. at 320 (categorically 
prohibiting the execution of mentally retarded offenders). By placing the 
mental retardation determination in the hands of the judge for a pretrial 
decision, “significant resources [could be] saved in terms of trial 
preparation, motion practice, voir dire, trial time, mitigation research, etc.,” 
if the defendant is found to have mental retardation.  United States v. 
Nelson, 419 F.Supp.2d 891, 893 (E.D. La. 2006); see also Morrow v. 
Alabama, 928 So.2d 315, 324 (Ala. Crim. App. 2004) (stating that pretrial 
Atkins determination by the court spares the parties from “the onerous 
burden of a futile bifurcated capital sentencing procedure”) (quoting 
Louisiana v. Williams, 831 So.2d 835, 860 (La. 2002), superseded by 
statute as stated in Louisiana v. Turner, 936 So.2d 89, 103 (La. 2006)); 
Hudson, supra note 118, at 390 (noting the economic benefits of having a 
judge resolve Atkins claims pretrial).  
124 Hudson, supra note 118, at 372. 
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that leaves determination of a capital defendant’s alleged 
mental retardation to the judge prior to the guilt phase.  
 
IX. CONCLUSION 
 The United States Supreme Court condemned the 
execution of mentally retarded capital defendants in Atkins 
because it studied the national consensus, which illustrated 
that the goals of the criminal justice system cannot be met by a 
person, who because of his mental limitations, cannot 
understand the consequences or wrongfulness of his actions.   
Because the Supreme Court left it to the states to apply the 
Atkins holding, the states should enact certain laws to protect 
the Court’s intention of not violating a capital defendant’s 
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights under the United 
States Constitution.  States should enact legislation that (1) 
shifts the burden of proof to the defendant because an 
allegation of mental retardation is an affirmative defense that 
should be borne by the defense, (2) sets a standard of 
preponderance of the evidence as the maximum standard of 
proof a capital defendant must meet to prove mental 
retardation because any higher standard of proof would 
unfairly allocate an erroneous risk to the defense that could 
mean death for someone who would otherwise be exempted 
from the death penalty, and (3) requires the determination of 
mental retardation be made prior to the penalty phase to 
encourage efficiency in time and expenses and to discourage 
bias.  Justice requires no less. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
